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| OUTLOOK - Saturday 15
June 2002 |
|
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BOOK
REVIEW Blame the
Burmese
British colonialism was a positive force
in Burma, according to one account
Myint Shwe
THE MAKING OF MODERN BURMA : By Thant
Myint-U Cambridge University Press, 2001 : 284 pp. US$23.63
History writing is always troublesome since it is
involves judging and interpreting a bygone era using
present-day yardsticks. It may be doubly troublesome when it
involves the study of former colonies by writers who come from
the colonising culture.
In today's post-colonial era,
Burmese history continues to be written by both natives of the
country and, more occasionally, by outside scholars who are
mainly from the West. Among Burmese writers, the country's
``rise and fall'' as a nation tends to be an over-riding
concern.
Western historians on the other hand tend to
focus on themes of tradition and modernity. Burma's
pre-colonial, monarchical era is largely judged as
``traditional''. The colonial era is seen as the time when
Burma was introduced to modernity, although sometimes it is
acknowledged that there were efforts _ too little, too late _
during the Konbaung era by King Mindon and his brother, Prince
Kanaung.
Burma today is seen as a place in which the
old and indigenous has failed to reckon with and adapt to the
new, foreign and superior. Its failure in this regard has
resulted in the near-elimination of the former, according to
the sort of academic Darwinism of Thant Myint-U's The Making
of Modern Burma.
The word ``modern'' in the book's
title may mislead some. A more accurate title would have been
``The Making of Colonial Burma''. The author covers a period
of half a century, from 1885, when Theebaw, Burma's last king,
was dethroned and shipped to India, up to 1925, the year
Theebaw's queen, Supayalat, died in Rangoon after a decade of
living there anonymously.
The year 1925, which fell
between two great wars, could be seen as the lowest point in
Burma's lost national consciousness. It was a dozen years
before the colony would have its first open revolt with an
emancipatory tinge _ the Saya San Peasant Rebellion of
1938.
This book gathers information from earlier works
to illustrate in undramatic but conclusive and picturesque
fashion the elimination of the indigenous monarchy and the
introduction of colonial administration. The twilight years of
the sovereign state and the early colonial years in which
Upper Burma was merged with the already annexed Lower Burma
are well told.
We discover the reason for the choice
of the word ``modern'' in the title _ it is the author's
belief that modernisation was introduced to Burma by British
colonisation.
The author argues that colonisation
brought Burma a series of benefits, included its current
political and geographical boundary and a much more centrally
controlled bureaucratic structure, which remains with us
today. The author apparently believes that World War Two was
unfortunate chiefly because it interrupted Burma's road to
modernisation.
This line of thinking is evident in
concluding remarks at the end of the book where he says that
unlike other colonised countries, Burma at independence
``faced a weak institutional legacy'' _ a vacuum which the new
wartime army [he means the Japanese-trained Burma Independence
Army, the BIA] was soon able to fill.''
We are invited
to deduce again that British colonialism was a force for the
country's ``own good'' and was, in fact, a blessing in
disguise. Also that the origins of the current notorious
ruling military junta can be traced back to that
``independence army''.
But evidence from elsewhere in
the book suggests clearly that there was no ``institutional
[that is, military] weakness'' at the time of independence,
when ethnic representatives rather than Burmese filled many
key positions. The first defence chief of staff of the
independent Union of Burma was not a Burmese, but a Karen, who
was succeeded by an Anglo-Burmese. Ne Win, the notorious
Burmese dictator, was only the third in line.
One could
be curious as to why the author does not engage with the fact
that, today, Burman nationalists of all persuasions complain
about the colonial legacy of divide and rule that was the
origin of the country's persistent ethnic strife.
This
is just one of the ``real costs'' of colonisation as against
the author's imagined benefits.
Had Burma not been a
victim of colonisation, how well would it have developed as an
independent sovereign nation? The opportunity to consider this
question is effectively eradicated once the reader accepts the
conclusion that colonisation was a ``blessing in disguise''
and that ``all that happened should have happened''.
Thant Myint-U tells the reader that the state leaders
of monarchical Burma were too incompetent to handle the
challenges of the times _ never mind the fact that challenging
Western imperialism was too enormous a job even for
sub-continental India and imperial China _ that Burma's
historical rival, Siam, was somehow able to cope with it. He
goes on: ``While the final nature of Western domination by the
end of the century differs considerably from state to state,
in all these countries, as in Burma, the outcome was
determined to a large extent by the local response to
contemporary challenges.'' This implies that the Burmese were
simply not as wise or flexible or smart as the
Siamese.
Such cold judgements can be seen throughout
the book. Lengthy attempts are made to understand the British
mind but the same is not done for the Burmese.
The
author reasons: ``British military intervention, when it did
come in 1885, took place within the context of increasing
exasperation on the part of Calcutta and London with the
unwillingness or inability of the Mandalay government
adequately to accommodate British commercial expansion and to
keep out foreign political influence in what was perceived as
a British sphere of influence.''
The sins of the
Burmese included ``agreements for the French to build and
manage a railway from Hanoi to Mandalay, control [of] the
Burmese ruby mines, and perhaps most importantly, a jointly
owned Royal Bank of Burma [with France].''
Thus, in
summary, ``... the British decided on the establishment of a
formal empire as a result of the inability of the Burmese
state to accommodate effectively their commercial and
strategic concerns.''
Again, the ultimate point being
made here is that it was only the Burmese themselves who are
to be blamed for British imperialism.
So what is the
book's relevance for today? Without some measure of
``timeliness'' in the context of today, a title like this is a
purely academic exercise.
It seems aimed at a general
readership since it is more descriptive than theoretical. And,
fortunately, it does offer _ whether deliberately or not _
just one lesson from history for the Burmese, but an important
one.
It sheds light on Burma's persistent,
thousand-year-old problem of leadership and statesmanship.
There have been continous problems around how to organise
successions without destabilising or even disintegrating
society.
The Burmese have never been great state
builders. Their monarchs were notoriously polygamous. They
wielded despotic power which resulted in massacres,
fratricide, even patricide. The great kingdoms built by
fathers were treated as private property, left for the hordes
of male offspring to spoil rather than sustain or develop.
Just below the top, a parasitic feudal officialdom seldom
displayed vision.
All this constituted a recipe for the
country's short-lived grandeur. This sizeable geopolitical
entity between India and China has risen and fallen on four
major occasions _ the periods of Pagan, Taungoo, Ava
(Mandalay) and Rangoon.
The third time was a total
humiliation resulting in lost national sovereignty, and the
present situation is a disaster amounting to a near-failure of
the state. The nosedive the country took in 1988 has not yet
been reversed.
The author comes from a politically
respectable family in Burma; he is a grandson of the third
secretary-general of the United Nations, U Thant. It will the
job of posterity to evaluate Thant Myint-U's work against and
along with that of other Burmese historians of modern times,
including U Pho Kyar, Htin Aung, Kyaw Thet, Daw Mya Sein, Ba
Shin, Than Tun, Nai Pan Hla, Daw Kyan and Ma Tin Win.uMyint
Shwe is a research associate focused on Burma at the Joint
Center for Asia and Pacific Studies, JCAP, York University and
University of Toronto, Canada.
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